research area.
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A path-breaking article by Occhino, Oosterlinck and White shows a 1943 transfer to Nazi Germany of a staggering 55.5% of French GDP. 4 Japanese exploitation, constrained by Japan's having little use for many Southeast Asian commodities and its lack of merchant shipping, fell short of Nazi levels. Nevertheless, throughout Southeast Asia exploitation was substantial and for Indochina reached over a third of that country's GDP.
Payments to Japan and the transfer of goods there were largely financed by high rates of growth of money supply. We argue that throughout Southeast Asia, Japanese coercive powers and the usefulness of money as a medium of exchange were important mechanisms in limiting inflation. Moreover, in the great Southeast Asian rice-producing countries of Thailand and Indochina, the continued willingness of peasant rice growers to hold Japanese notes as a store of value kept inflation multiples close to those of money supply increase. In Southeast Asia, hyperinflation appeared only late in the war.
Eight sections comprise the remainder of this paper. The next section identifies two patterns of military occupation and the monetary arrangements associated with each. In the second section, we measure payments to Japan, show how they were financed, and evaluate the fit between Southeast Asian productive capacity and Japan's wartime needs. A third section sets out a model of money demand and seigniorage -the ability of government with a monetary monopoly to finance expenditure by issuing money -to assess Japanese finance and financial policies in Southeast Asia. The fourth section quantifies drastic wartime declines in Southeast Asian GDP, along with Japan's increasing need for war finance, and considers both in light of the model. Trends in money supply growth and inflation are traced in the fifth section, while the sixth and seventh sections assess reasons for a surprisingly high willingness of Southeast Asians to hold real balances and be taxed through inflation. A final section places Japanese war finance in the wider context of the economics of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
OCCUPATION PATTERNS, BANKING, EXCHANGE RATES, AND SCRIP
Two patterns of occupation administration obtained. In Thailand and Indochina, occupation was mediated through pre-war governments -a Thai-run government in Thailand and the French colonial administration in Indochina. These governments were left to determine how to pay for resource transfers to Japan. By contrast, Malaya, Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines fell under military administration.
After occupying Southeast Asia, among Japan's first acts was to revalue the yen and set a unit of each of Southeast Asia's currencies equal to one yen. Compared to 1937 exchange rates, the yen gained in value by between 35% and 101% against Southeast Asian currencies. Goods in Southeast Asia were made cheap for Japan.
During World War II, Japan, unlike Germany, did not try to maintain and make use of the banking structure in occupied territories.
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Throughout Southeast Asia, pre-war banks associated in any way with Allied countries were shut down. This meant the closure, and eventual liquidation, of almost all European banks. Since these banks had dominated pre-war banking, deposit banking in Southeast Asia was largely eliminated. 6 Although Asian banks were allowed to re-open during 1942 and 1943, they did relatively little business, except in Thailand, which was allied with Japan. Money in Thailand and Indochina continued to be issued by pre-war monetary authorities. For the rest of Southeast Asia, Japan printed military scrip, beginning possibly as 5 Bloc and Hoselitz, Economics, p. 61. 6 United States, Office of Strategic Services, Japanese financial programs, pp. 227-28; United States, Office of 4 early as January 1941. 8 Scrip, literally campaign money given to Japan's invading forces, was legal tender only in the occupied territories. With 'appropriate' pictures -banana plants for Malaya and Indonesia, pagodas for Burma -scrip looked quite different from prewar notes. It incorporated 'none of the refinements of the Japanese-sponsored currencies in North and Central Occupied China'. 9 Print quality was, the Japanese acknowledged, 'appalling' and it deteriorated as the war continued. 10 Before then, however, Japan's occupation currencies attracted derisive names: 'banana money' in Malaya and Indonesia, 'Mickey Mouse money' in the Philippines.
In military-administered Southeast Asia, the Yokohama Specie Bank, and in the Philippines the Bank of Taiwan, soon replaced the military for the issue of scrip. A specialist bank, the Southern Regions Development Bank, was set up to finance long-term resource development in Southeast Asia. However, when insufficient Southeast Asian economic development materialized to afford the Bank a meaningful role, it took over the issue of scrip.
The Southern Regions Development Bank started issuing scrip in April 1942, although in some areas not until 1943. Notes remained identical to those used by the military and the Yokohama Specie Bank and were still printed in Tokyo.
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Like the Yokohama Specie Bank, the Southern Regions Development Bank functioned as a no more than a conduit through which currency passed on its way to the military and into circulation. 12 Over the first year or so of the war in the military-occupied countries, pre-war colonial currencies were allowed to circulate at par alongside Japanese military scrip. Some foreign currencies also circulated, for example the US dollar in the Philippines. programs, 237; Cribb, 'Political dimensions', p. 114; Longmuir, Money trail, p. 125; Romualdez, 'Financial problems', p. 460. Subsequently, however, scrip drove colonial monies from open circulation through a combination of the operation of Gresham's Law that bad money drives out good and, as later discussed, because of strong Japanese coercion beginning around late 1942.
PAYMENTS AND TRANSFER OF GOODS TO JAPAN
The mechanism by which the Japanese transferred resources to themselves through the use of scrip in Malaya, Indonesia, the Philippines and Burma involved nothing more than printing the required amount of currency. Acquiring currency to spend in Thailand and Indochina was a more complicated process. However, as this section shows, the effect was like issuing scrip, since in exchange for local Thai or Indochinese currency Japan gave no money or credits convertible into tangible goods. This section goes on to identify large Southeast Asian payments to the Japanese and the need to finance these by money creation.
Occupation costs, bilateral clearing arrangements and yen credits
Japan used baht in Thailand and piastres in Indochina to buy goods it exported and to meet local military and administrative (occupation) costs. When Japanese officials, after some negotiation with the Thai or Indochinese governments, specified currency requirements, the Yokohama Specie Bank credited at the Bank of Japan in Tokyo the accounts of the Bank of Siam (established in December 1942) or Banque de l'Indochine with the yen equivalent of baht or piastres to be given to Japan. These Southeast Asian 'central banks' then credited the Yokohama Specie Bank in Bangkok or Saigon with local currency for military use.
14 Yen credited to Thailand and Indochina were 'special' yen. They could not be spent in Japan nor used to purchase imports from Japan. Thailand did, however, succeed in reaching an agreement for some 10% of its yen credits to be converted into gold held in Tokyo.
14 Bank of England OV25/9 Extract from Bangkok Times 'Japan-Thailand economic co-operation. New agreement now signed. The system of settlement ' 4 May 1942; Thailand, Report 1941 -1950 Although occupation costs typically exceeded actual military and administrative costs, bilateral clearing agreements negotiated with Thailand and Indochina were potentially an even more powerful means of extraction. They gave Japan purchasing power in Thailand and Indochina that was in essence limited only by the physical capacities of the two countries to provide goods and services for Japan; by how far Japan could in fact use goods from the two countries; and by the availability of shipping to carry goods.
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As such, bilateral agreements suited not just wartime finance but Japan's long-term goals of integrating Southeast Asia into the yen bloc and creating an empire in East Asia.
Payments to Japan
The largest payments and goods sent to Japan were from Thailand, Indochina and Indonesia.
These are also the countries for which wartime national income estimates allow quantification of transfers to Japan as a share of GDP (table 1) . For all three countries, exploitation was substantial at arbitrary, wartime exchange rates. It was much greater at 1937 rates which proxy market rates. Between 1942 and 1945, Thailand's payments averaged 6% of GDP at wartime rates and a little over 9% at 1937 rates. Payments made by Indochina rose from 9.1% of GDP in 1942 to 25.4% by 1945, equivalent to over a third of GDP at 1937 exchange rates. Large Indochinese payments, probably the biggest in Southeast Asia, are explained by Indochina's role as Japan's principal military and logistical base in Southeast Asia; by Indochina's position as the second main Japanese source (just behind Korea) of rice imports; and by successful Japanese manipulation of the pro-Vichy colonial government.
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Payments from Indonesia fell sharply, after reaching 11.2% of GDP in 1943, or nearly twice that at pre-war rates. The fall reflected the fact that Japan's chief use for Indonesia was to extract petroleum, and that by 1944 its shipment to Japan had become difficult. During 15 Wiwat, Wiwatthanachaiyanuson, ; United States, Office of Strategic Services, Financial relations between Siam and Japan, p. 6. 16 Robequain, Economic development, . By 1942, Japan almost completely controlled Indochina surpluses. See also, Decoux, A la barre de l'Indochine, 1944 American submarine and air attacks reduced Japanese merchant shipping to 40%, and in 1945 to under a quarter, of its 1941 tonnage.
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In 1944, the inability to move refined products home or to war zones caused Japan to limit oil refinery operations in Southeast Asia; the last Japanese tanker convoy for Japan left Singapore on 19 March 1945. 18 Without oil Japan did not have airplanes; that gave the Allies open bombing targets.
During the war, the composition of Thai and Indochinese payments to Japan altered radically as Japan both lost control of Pacific shipping lanes and increased Japanese military expenditure and troops in Southeast Asia against apparent near certainty of Allied invasion.
Initially, available merchant shipping and Japan's war needs at home, mainly for rice, made trade surpluses the chief component of payments (table 2) . By the last two years of the war, however, occupation costs comprised over 90% of payments as Japan's emphasis shifted towards the defence of Southeast Asia.
A number of resource transfers from Southeast Asia to Japan can not be reliably quantified and the payments shown in table 1 are a lower bound of total transfers. Plunder was not especially great but included, for example, four months' supply of crude oil from Indonesia and about 150,000 tons of rubber from Malaya.
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Looting was significant in regard to all types of transport. Quantities of railway rolling stock and rails were taken from around Southeast Asia, especially from Malaya, to build the Siam-Burma railway.
A high proportion of Southeast Asians did at least some 'voluntary' work towards the Japanese war effort and large numbers were co-opted as forced labour. Among the most egregious instances were many of Indonesia's some 2.6 million romusha (volunteers) Milward, War, economy, p. 165. laid. Payment at less than market wages of a proportion of those working for the Japanese were a tax, as were forced deliveries of food, mainly rice in Indonesia and Indochina, at below market prices. Overall, probably at least five million Southeast Asian civilians died prematurely as a result of the Japanese occupation. While their lives could be valued and a cost assigned, this was not a payment or transfer to Japan, and in any case the meaning of such quantification seems doubtful.
Why weren't payments from Southeast Asia larger?
Although the payments in table 1 constitute a lower bound for total resource transfers to Japan, these seem unlikely anywhere in Southeast Asia to have approached the 1943 high point of over 50% of GDP that Nazi Germany extracted from France. Even in Indochina, Japan was unable to achieve exploitation on the scale envisaged.
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There were three main reasons for the comparatively smaller payments from Southeast Asia to Japan than France to Germany, none of them financial. First, Southeast Asia was a collection of highly specialized monoeconomies. Pre-war Southeast Asia exported just four main commodities -rice, rubber, tin and sugar -to the global (chiefly Western) market. The region produced these commodities in far greater quantities than Japan could use. Japan's annual wartime requirement for rubber of 75,000 tons was less than 7% of combined Malayan and Indonesian rubber exports in 1940. No Southeast Asian country was more than half self-sufficient in textiles; none among the region's group of minimally industrialized economies had a manufacturing base able to contribute industrial goods needed by Japan's war economy.
Second, as discussed above, even for those Southeast Asian commodities that Japan could use, by 1944 there were severe shortages of merchant shipping to transport these goods.
Third, Japan's rapid initial conquests boxed it into diverting resources to the defence of military or strategic areas over much of Southeast Asia's 1.7m square miles even though they supplied few, if any, goods to Japan. The main Japanese interest in Burma was to close the Burma Road as a supply route to Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist army and as a defensive perimeter protecting Thailand. Japan obtained virtually no goods from Burma but had 185,149 soldiers die there, a twelfth of Japanese losses in the war as a whole.
21
Singapore was key for strategic control of the Pacific, not for Malayan rubber. The Philippines was primarily important to secure shipping routes between Southeast Asia and Japan.
Over the course of the war, Japan secured relatively little from Southeast Asia. 
Financing payments
War can be financed by selling bonds at home or internationally, through taxation, and by printing money. In Southeast Asia, the Japanese relied heavily, and increasingly, on money creation and its associated seigniorage. Table 3 details this for Thailand and Indochina. During the war, in both countries increases in government revenue lagged well behind inflation. Conventional government expenditure alone gave rise to modest budget deficits and these plus, in effect, additional wartime government spending for occupation costs and trade surpluses with Japan created large gaps between government total spending (conventional spending plus payments to Japan) and government revenue. Printing more currency, measured in table 3 by the annual change in money supply, largely filled the gap.
From 1943 onwards in each of the two countries, money financed half to three quarters of total government spending. The share of money in government finance was almost certainly as large, and probably larger, in the four militarily-administered Southeast Asian countries, 21 Allen, 'Burma', p. 301. 22 Japan, Return of foreign trade, 1941-1944-48. since exploitation of occupied countries, whether realized through taxation or monetary expansion, is typically maximized when governments are left in place.
Even if Japan had not favoured the 'direct means' of selling special yen and issuing scrip, alternatives to this financing of expenditure through money creation were limited.
Neither the Thai and Indochinese governments nor Japanese military administrations had any possibility of borrowing internationally. Although in Japan war finance relied primarily on making financial institutions buy government bonds, nowhere in occupied Asia was their sale attempted to more than a very limited extent.
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In Southeast Asia, the elimination of most of the pre-war banking structure and lack of any real market for government paper would have made bond sales difficult. Governments did, however, introduce many new taxes and, as in Japan, use savings campaigns to try to raise finance.
The wartime collapse in exports and per capita income largely destroyed pre-war Southeast Asian tax structures.
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Governments and Japanese administrators made considerable efforts to replace these in order to limit money creation. Both the Asian news media and Allied intelligence describe numerous saving schemes, for example in March 1944 a 'gigantic saving campaign' in Malaya. 25 Taxes included 'voluntary' gifts, levied mainly on Chinese businessmen, lotteries, and taxes on gambling, amusement parks, cockpits, bicycles, hand carts, taxi dancers, restaurants and coffee shops, the last three associated with the great wartime upsurge in prostitution.
Japanese lack of interest in bond finance was not, however, entirely shared by Southeast Asian governments which, beginning in 1943, looked to soak up excess purchasing power and restrict inflation. Doubts over the viability of bond sales in Indochina, and the advisability of their limited use, were confirmed by experience in Burma. bonds issued by the puppet Ba Maw government went on sale in Rangoon and rural areas.
While the local press hailed the issue as a great success, the absence of further issues suggests otherwise. 27 Thailand's government issued 30m baht of 3% saving bonds in 1944. It also gave bonds at 1% interest to compensate for the February 1945 demonetization of 1,000 baht notes.
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The main example of bond finance was in the Philippines. The pre-war state-owned Philippine National Bank was not liquidated and could be made to purchase most of a substantial amount of Puppet Republic bonds issued by the Laurel government. Under the restricted banking regime of wartime Southeast Asia, the aggregate money stock, M, closely approximated the nominal money base, H. In Southeast Asia, this base divided by the price level, P, are real money balances, h = H/P.
Recognising the effect of inflation on the willingness to hold money, a modified quantity theory demand for money function is: h = kY -bπ (1) 27 Burma Intelligence Bureau, Burma, pp. 108-9. 28 Wiwat, Wiwatthanachaiyanuson, p. 91; Thailand, Report 1941 -1950 . 29 Romualdez, 'Financial problems', p. 459; United States, Office of Strategic Services, Japanese financial programs, pp. 245-46. 30 Bruno, 'High inflation'; And Bordo and Jonung, Long-run for a comprehensive study of money velocity.
where k takes account of the transactions and store of value motives for holding scrip; Y is national income, and b measures the inflation responsiveness of the demand for real balances. 
SOUTHEAST ASIAN GDP AND FINANCE FOR OCCUPATION AND WAR
For high inflation regimes, the usual assumption is that 'wealth in real terms and real income seem to be relatively stable during hyperinflation'; near stability, Phillip Cagan goes on to point out, is necessary to make valid 'the hypothesis that changes in real cash balances in hyperinflation result from variations in the expected rate of change in prices'.
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The first part of this section shows that, contrary to stable real incomes, occupied Southeast Asia experienced large income falls. These almost certainly put strong leftwards pressure on the 31 Cagan, 'Monetary dynamics ', pp. 31-33. money demand curve in figure 1. The remainder of the section describes Japan's increasing need to raise finance in Southeast Asia as the war outlook worsened. Since Japanese war finance relied chiefly on money and associated seigniorage, this would have led to rightwards shifts in the dd curve in figure 1.
Wartime Southeast Asian GDP
In World War II Southeast Asia, 'Economic life receded from modernity'; countries retreated 'toward an isolation and autarchy that harked back to precolonial times'. Second, the military-induced expansion of wage labour to construct defences increased the demand of Southeast Asians for money to buy food and other necessities.
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At the same time as the greater Japanese need for seigniorage must have shifted rightwards the dd curve in figure 1 , larger defence expenditure exercised a rightwards influence on the money demand curve and helped to offset the inflationary effects of Japanese war finance.
MONEY SUPPLY AND INFLATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Data sources
Money supply data, described in the appendix, derive mainly from official Japanese records kept by the Ministry of Finance in Tokyo and for Thailand and Indochina from government records. For almost the whole of the war data are reliable. Near its end, however, in militarily-occupied countries Japanese record keeping deteriorated or ceased and some data depend on Allied reconstruction. obtain rationed goods which became a main source of food and clothing, and to purchase lottery tickets, pay at amusement parks and so forth.
Money supply and inflation
Scrip was, however, largely, and increasingly, shunned as a store of value. In Malaya, 'only the most stupid were lulled into a sense of wealth' by holding large quantities of Japanese notes. Others 'who had amassed "fortunes" quickly changed the paper money into commodities, and substantial investments'.
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Apparently, given the opportunity even the clerks in Japanese banks changed their pocket money into British currency. 
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In the Philippines, prices rose each time air-raid precautions and defence drills were held in Manila.
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Insofar as money, as opposed to jewels or durable goods, remained a store of value, this largely devolved to pre-war currencies exchanged among those considered trustworthy. 52 
Thailand, Indochina and Burma
In Thailand and Indochina, the record of maintaining real money balances is impressive (figures 2 and 3) . The same appears to be true of Burma for much of the period that encompassed the establishment of a Japanese regime, the nominally independent Ba Maw government formed in August 1943, and until the country's 1945 descent into military chaos.
The maintenance of real balances is especially striking, since models like that in figure 1 specify a negative relationship between money demand and inflation and implicitly assume constant real income. Falls in GDP, as in wartime Southeast Asia, would shift the demand for real balances leftwards and point to the likelihood of hyperinflation. These were, a wartime Burmese government official recalled, the only legal currency and an unwillingness to accept them 'meant imprisonment, torture or death'.
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The Thai and Indochinese governments helped to sustain a demand for money through policies to support producers by buying their output.
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The unchanged wartime look of the Thai baht and Indochina piastre probably encouraged confidence in these currencies. By seeming to assure money's store of value properties, this may have contributed to the maintenance of real balances. But the principal explanation lies elsewhere. High real balances in Thailand, Indochina and, for at least part of the war, in Burma are explained mainly by the composition of production in these three economies, their production structures, and the near absence even of simple consumer goods to buy during much of the conflict. All three economies were overwhelmingly rural and highly specialized in rice production. Rice, in turn, was grown by numerous small peasant growers. Unlike producers in the rice deficit areas, they could easily achieve food selfsufficiency since rice was in over-supply and many other basic foodstuffs could be obtained through household production or barter. Small rural cultivators like those dominating rice production in Thailand, Indochina and Burma tend to hoard money, even in the face of inflation. Under inflationary conditions, Keynes observed, as 'more money flows into the pockets of the peasants, it tends to stick there'.
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For Thailand, it was explained that only 20% or 25% of notes in circulation were in Bangkok; 'The rest are in the provinces where they disappear into farmers' hoards: and the demand of the provinces for fresh supplies of notes is a never ceasing one'.
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In Burma, during the war's latter stages, villagers in the rice-producing districts still insisted on payment in Japanese currency: 'They thought it was better than British and enjoyed the feeling of wealth which they got by carrying away large wads of brand new Jap notes'.
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Even when brought to the cities, rural dwellers like Indochina's Cao Dài religious sect apparently had consumption patterns little affected by inflation. In Saigon, the Japanese relied heavily on the Cao Dài for their workforce who, being vegetarians 'ate simple food with lots of vegetables, rice, and seeds. Any extra money they earned went back to their families or to their temples'.
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Peasant money illusion may not, however, fully account for the holding of money in rice-surplus areas. Producers in these areas had limited spending opportunities. None of the rice-producing economies were close to self-sufficiency even in basic consumer items, and since Japan sent few goods to Southeast Asia there was little to buy in rural areas.
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Given this absence of goods, and if Southeast Asians anticipated a post-war redemption of wartime notes, it was rational to hold money in the expectation of its commanding more goods after the war. The wartime price of unavailable goods was infinite. But when war scarcities ended 56 Keynes, Tract, p. 66. 57 Thailand, Report 1941 -1950 . The same hoarding behavior was repeated in Thailand's 1949 Thailand's -1951 This section quantifies seigniorage and decomposes it into revenue from changes in real money balances and the inflation tax.
Components of seigniorage
Seigniorage can be written as:
where, as before, H is money and P the price level. Letting  stand for inflation, and both adding and subtracting the lagged real base to and from the right side of equation (3) yields:
Real seigniorage is therefore made up of two elements. The first (in square brackets)
is the change in real money balances from one period to the next. Normally, this accounts for 61 Keynes, Tract, p. 37. 62 Palairet, Four ends, about half of seigniorage and can be its main component in an economy experiencing high real GDP. The second (product of brackets) term represents the inflation tax. It is the tax levied on the real base and the amount by which the private sector must augment its nominal money holdings to maintain the same value of the real balances when inflation is positive.
Japanese finance in wartime Southeast Asia relied chiefly and increasingly on this inflation tax (table 6) . Nevertheless, important differences are apparent between rice-surplus Thailand, Indochina and Burma, where real balances were generally maintained, and Malaya, the Philippines, Indonesia and Burma, after 1944, where they were not. In Thailand and Indochina, high real balances, despite high inflation and falling GDP, allowed increasing amounts of seigniorage to be realized at relatively low tax rates. Between 1942 and 1944, seigniorage in Thailand doubled while the inflation tax (although still near 100%) fell somewhat. In 1945, however, the contribution of real balances became negative as Thais sought to avoid the tax on inflation.
To try to preserve seigniorage, Japanese military administrators had to rely on high inflation taxes to try to offset strongly negative changes in real balances. In the Philippines, the inflation tax reached 651% in 1943 and 778.1% in 1944. That did not, however, prevent a sharp fall in seigniorage as populations sought to avoid taxation.
Seigniorage and inflation instability
The model in figure 1 predicts that with the money demand function shifting left (for the reasons mentioned earlier), and on approaching A = B on any given hyperbola, Southeast Asian economies would be entering an unstable inflation regime. For the most part, even Southeast Asia's military-administered countries seem not to have moved beyond this unstable A = B tangency until late in the war.
In the model if the inflation instability occurs and if a fall in seigniorage is sufficient to restore some semblance of stability (back shift of the hyperbola), equilibrium on the new hyperbola would likely be of variety 'A' rather than 'B'. This suggests that inflation instability would tend to rise at the same time that the level of real seigniorage was tending to decline.
The Philippines, the only Southeast Asian country with sufficient data available, provides evidence to assess this prediction.
In Finance for the bulk of spending overseas came, as with Southeast Asia, from these areas themselves.
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Existing data preclude a balancing figure for spending in Japan for the war in Southeast Asia to set against the spending imposed on Southeast Asians. Probably, however, expenditure in Japan was at least as much as in Southeast Asia. Although the Japanese Navy spent less in total than the Army, it spent significantly more at home and since naval forces operated chiefly in the Pacific rather than China much of this spending would have related to Southeast Asia.
After deciding on war to pursue empire, Japan had little alternative to inflation as the main way to finance occupation in Southeast Asia, and almost certainly also saw its advantages. Although in the longer term high inflation might well re-order Southeast Asian societies, this was not inconsistent with the aim of replacing the pre-war order with Japanese empire. At the same time, inflation offered an efficient means of wartime finance. It avoided the enforcement problems of overt taxation in a big geographical area with a predominantly rural population and over which Japanese officials, forced to take over the entire administration of four countries, were thinly spread. Tax collection was further complicated since few Southeast Asians spoke Japanese or, as occupation continued, remained sympathetic to Japan.
Key financial aspects of an extension to Southeast Asia of a managed, Japan-centred In Southeast Asia, a continuing demand for real balances enabled Japan to avoid issuing as much new money as would have been required if the demand for real balances had been less and therefore the rise in prices greater. Scrip, occupation costs, clearing arrangements and seigniorage afforded Japan a low-cost way to finance occupation and gain control of Southeast Asian resources. In the end, however, major Japanese failures in naval strategy, planning and the protection of merchant shipping prevented the full exploitative potential of the financial measures analyzed in this paper from being realized.
Thailand: Money supply and Yen credits : Thailand, Statistical yearbook,1939 -40 -1944 Thailand, Report of the Financial Adviser 1941 -1950 Money is the change in money supply from official statistics. This change as a percentage of total government expenditure and government revenue as a percentage of total government expenditure does not add to 100% in any one calendar year. However, for both Thailand and Indochina over the five years 1941-1945 the totals for government expenditure plus money add to close to 500%. There were also small sales of bonds in the two countries but data for these sales are not available. Source: Appendix. 
